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MERCER E. BULLARD*
Insider Trading in Mutual Funds
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or“SEC”) has recently attempted to establish a new form of
insider trading: the use of nonpublic information about mutual
fund portfolio holdings to engage in fund arbitrage.  In a series of
settled cases, the Commission has alleged that six mutual fund
managers violated section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (“Advisers Act”)1 by selectively disclosing material, non-
public information about their funds’ portfolio holdings to fund
arbitrageurs.2  The Commission has asserted that arbitrageurs
used the information to engage in insider trading to the detri-
ment of other shareholders of the funds.3  This Article argues
that information about a fund’s portfolio holdings is not, how-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.  I have in-
terests in the issues discussed in this Article in a variety of capacities. I would like to
thank Kalyna Bullard, Louisa Bullard, Hardy Callcott, Donna Davis, George
Cochran, Jim Curtis, Evan Geldzahler, Matthew Hall, Farish Percy, Paul Secunda,
and Michael Waterstone for their time and helpful comments and suggestions.
1 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2000).
2 See Banc One Inv. Advisors Corp., Investment Company Act Release No.
26,490, 83 SEC Docket 695, 84 SEC Docket 2404, 2004 WL 1472043 (June 29, 2004);
Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470, 83
SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874 (June 21, 2004); Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 82
SEC Docket 3178, 2004 WL 1124933 (May 20, 2004); Complaint, SEC v. PIMCO
Advisors Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 04 Civ. 3464 (VM) (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2004); Putnam
Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C. (Putnam II), Investment Company Act Release No. 26,412, 82
SEC Docket 2225, 2004 WL 865794 (Apr. 8, 2004); Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P.
(Alliance II), Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket 3401,
2004 WL 67564 (Jan. 15, 2004) (amending Dec. 18, 2003 order); Alliance Capital
Mgmt., L.P. (Alliance I), Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312, 81 SEC
Docket 2800, 2003 WL 22988724; Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C. (Putnam I), Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 26,255, 81 SEC Docket 1913, 2003 WL 22683975
(Nov. 13, 2003).  The Commission also settled claims against one fund manager’s
CEO for aiding and abetting the manager’s section 204A violation. See  Harold J.
Baxter, Exchange Act Release No. 50,681, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,656, 84 SEC Docket 340, 2004 WL 2609265, at *2, *5 (Nov. 17, 2004).
3 See, e.g. , Pilgrim Baxter , 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874 (through defen-
dant, arbitrageurs were provided with nonpublic information about fund holdings
that they used to facilitate fund arbitrage).
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ever, inside information for purposes of insider trading and sec-
tion 204A and that the SEC’s selective disclosure cases would be
summarily dismissed if actually litigated.
Insider trading assumes that there is “inside” information to
which the market is not privy, but information about a fund’s
portfolio does not provide such inside information.  When a
trader has inside knowledge about an operating company’s posi-
tive prospects that is not reflected in the company’s share price,
the trader can profit by buying the company’s stock while the
information is still nonpublic and then selling it for a profit after
the information has been released and incorporated into the
stock price.4  In contrast, inside knowledge about the contents of
a fund’s portfolio by itself reveals nothing about what the value
of the fund’s shares will be in the future.
Mutual fund arbitrage depends on the availability of opportu-
nities to purchase fund shares at a discount, which occurs only
when the fund violates applicable pricing and sales rules.  Mutual
fund shares are not traded on a secondary market but are re-
quired to be sold only at their next computed per share net asset
value.5  If a fund undervalues its shares or sells shares at previ-
ously computed prices, in each case in violation of applicable
rules, traders can buy shares at prices that understate their cur-
rent value and sell them at a profit the next day when the pricing
error is corrected.  Access to information about a fund’s portfolio
holdings can facilitate such arbitrage, but it is not a necessary
element for successful fund arbitrage and is never sufficient.  If a
fund complies with pricing and sales rules, fund arbitrage is not
possible, regardless of how much information is selectively dis-
closed about the fund’s portfolio.
These pricing and sales rules, as well as the mechanics of fund
arbitrage and the use of fund portfolio information in arbitrage,
are discussed in Part I of this Article.  Part II argues that selec-
tive disclosure of the contents of a fund portfolio does not consti-
tute the kind of misuse of material, nonpublic information that
4 See  Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market , 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1431 (1967).
5 For purposes of this Article, the term “mutual fund” does not include an ex-
change-traded fund.  An exchange-traded fund is a mutual fund that permits the
direct purchase and redemption of its shares only in very large aggregations.  The
shares of ETFs trade on exchanges, like stocks. See generally  iShares, Inc., Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 25,595, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,684 (June 5, 2002). See also
infra  text accompanying notes 100-13.
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section 204A is intended to prevent but that selective disclosure
of inside information about fund transactions or valuations (as
opposed to portfolio holdings) may trigger section 204A liability.
Part III contends that the SEC’s new rules regarding funds’ port-
folio disclosure policies are as misguided as its selective disclo-
sure prosecutions in that both the rules and prosecutions
misunderstand the true source of the harm caused by arbitrage.
Fund arbitrage is enabled not by selective disclosure of portfolio
information but by funds’ violations of applicable pricing and
sales rules, and it is on these rules, not funds’ portfolio disclosure




To understand the dynamics of insider trading in mutual fund
shares, it is necessary to understand the rules under which mu-
tual fund shares are priced and sold.  Mutual fund prices are
fixed, and the sale of fund shares is strictly regulated under the
Investment Company Act of 1940,6 the primary statute governing
the operation and distribution of mutual funds.
A. Transactions in Mutual Fund Shares
Mutual funds act as intermediaries between investors and the
securities markets.  Investors purchase shares of a fund from the
fund itself, and the fund generally invests the proceeds of these
purchases in a diversified pool of securities.  Fund shareholders
own a pro rata interest in the fund and generally share the fund’s
investment returns and expenses in proportion to the size of their
ownership interest.  This sharing of expenses can create econo-
mies of scale in both the administration of the fund and the trans-
action costs incurred in investing the fund’s assets in the
securities markets.  The mutual fund form thus enables investors
to own an interest in a diversified pool of securities that can mini-
mize transaction costs through the economies of scale generated
by spreading costs over a large asset base.
Mutual funds also offer liquidity.  A mutual fund is defined as
an “open-end” investment company, which is a company that “is
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000).
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offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security.”7
A holder of a “redeemable security” is entitled “to receive ap-
proximately his proportionate share of the issuer’s current net
assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.”8  The fund must stand
ready to redeem shares at their market value, or per share “net
asset value” (NAV), and pay the redemption proceeds within
seven days of tender of the shares.9  Mutual fund shareholders
are thus assured that they can sell their shares at their net asset
value on short notice, a feature that is an important contributor
to the enormous popularity of mutual funds.10
When calculating a fund’s net asset value, its portfolio securi-
ties must be valued, if “market quotations are readily available,”
at their current market value.11  If market quotations are not
readily available, portfolio securities must be valued based on
their “fair value as determined in good faith by the [fund’s]
board of directors.”12  Funds choose the time or times of day as
of which they price their shares, but in practice, virtually all funds
price their shares once a day as of 4:00 p.m. eastern standard
time.13  Fund shares must be sold by the funds and their distribu-
tors at their per share NAV, and there is no secondary market for
fund shares.14  This means that all fund sales and redemptions
7 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1).
8 Id. § 80a-2(a)(32).
9 See id.§ 80a-22(e).
10 Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782,
70 Fed. Reg. 13,328 (proposed Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270)
(“[R]edemption right makes funds attractive to fund investors, most of whom are
long-term investors, because it provides ready access to their money if they should
need it.”).  Mutual fund assets exceed $8.1 trillion.  See  Investment Company Insti-
tute, Trends in Mutual Fund Investing, December 2004 , Jan. 28, 2005, http://
www.ici.org/stats/latest/trends_12_04.html.
11 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2005).
12 Id.
13 A small minority of funds price their shares more than once each day, see, e.g. ,
FIDELITY INVESTMENT, AVAILABLE PRODUCTS: FIDELITY SELECT PORTFOLIOS,
http://personal.fidelity.com/products/funds/content/sector/products.shtml (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2005) (stating policy of calculating fund’s NAV once every hour during
the business day), and/or price their shares at times other than 4:00 p.m.  For exam-
ple, the Guinness Atkinson Asia Focus Fund and Guinness Atkinson China & Hong
Kong Fund calculate their prices at 12:30 a.m. See  Guinness Atkinson Funds, Pro-
spectus, Apr. 30, 2005, at 20, http://www.gafunds.com/prospectus.pdf.  These funds
price their shares early in the morning to prevent pricing arbitrage, as discussed
infra  at text accompanying notes 23-28.  For purposes of simplicity, this Article as-
sumes that all funds price their shares at 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, although
this is not required.
14 But see  Ilana Polyak, PSSST, Buddy, Wanna Hot Share in a Long-Closed Mu-
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occur at their per share NAV.
Finally, mutual funds are required to use forward pricing.  This
means that funds are required to execute purchases and redemp-
tions at a price based on the fund’s per share net asset value
“which is next computed after receipt of . . . tender.”15  If a
purchase or sale order is submitted at 4:01 p.m., it must be as-
signed the next day’s 4:00 p.m. price.  The Commission has pro-
hibited funds from selling shares at previously calculated, or
“backward,” prices to protect fund shareholders from dilution of
their interests.  Before this prohibition was enacted, traders were
permitted to purchase shares at backward prices, and when posi-
tive information about the fund’s portfolio securities was re-
leased after the time as of which the fund was priced, these
traders would profit at the expense of the other shareholders.16
The Commission recently has brought a number of cases that al-
lege that investors and brokers violated the forward pricing rule
by assigning the fund’s 4:00 p.m. price to orders that were re-
ceived after 4:00 p.m.17
When funds sell and redeem their shares in accordance with
the foregoing rules, traders generally cannot exploit inside infor-
mation about the contents of a fund’s portfolio to gain an advan-
tage in trading shares of the fund.  If fund shares are accurately
priced at their current market value and trades occur only at for-
ward (“next computed”) prices, then inside information about
the fund portfolio provides no additional insight into the true
value of the fund.  Inside information about an operating com-
pany can provide reliable insight into its future market price, but
tual Fund? Secondary Market – Ebay, too – Has Funds Otherwise Unavailable , IN-
VESTMENT NEWS, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13 (describing black market in shares of mutual
funds that are closed to new investors).
15 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2005).  The Commission has proposed to replace the
phrase “which is next computed” with “established as of the next pricing time” to
clarify that the relevant time is not the time the fund’s pricing staff actually “com-
putes” the value of the fund, which is completed after 4:00 p.m., but the time “as of
which” the fund’s value is computed.  Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of
Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg.
70,388, 70,391 n.26 (Dec. 17, 2003).
16 See Markovitz, Exchange Act Release No. 48,588, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,201, 81 SEC Docket 450, 2003 WL 22258425, at *2 (Oct. 2, 2003)
(“[T]he late trader obtains an advantage—at the expense of the other shareholders
of the mutual fund—when he learns of information and is able to purchase (or sell)
mutual fund shares at prices set before  the information was available.”).  This prac-
tice is now known as “late trading,” discussed infra  Part I.B.
17 See, e.g. , id.
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fund portfolio information by itself generally cannot provide reli-
able insight into the fund’s future per share NAV.  As discussed
below, however, portfolio information can be useful to traders
when fund prices are miscalculated or traders are permitted to
purchase shares at backward prices.
B. The Mechanics of Fund Arbitrage
The SEC’s mutual fund insider trading cases involve situations
in which fund prices were mispriced and traders were permitted
to purchase shares at backward prices.  Such mispricing and
backward pricing enable two kinds of fund arbitrage:  pricing ar-
bitrage, and late trading, the mechanics of which are briefly de-
scribed below.18
Late trading occurs when funds permit backward pricing in vi-
olation of the forward pricing rule,19 that is, they permit an inves-
tor to purchase fund shares after the time as of which the fund is
priced.20  Late trading enables the arbitrageur to base his deci-
sion on market events that occur after the time as of which the
fund’s price was calculated.21  Companies in which funds invest
often release market-moving information, such as earnings an-
nouncements, after the close of the New York Stock Exchange at
4:00 p.m.22  If the post-4:00 p.m. information is positive, the re-
sulting increase in the value of the company’s stock will also in-
crease the value of the fund’s portfolio.  The late trader
purchases the fund’s shares at the old 4:00 p.m. price, which is the
18 The mechanics of fund arbitrage are explained more fully in Mercer Bullard,
The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s Re-
sponse to the Mutual Fund Scandal , 42 HOUSTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
19 See supra  text accompanying notes 14-16; Markovitz , 81 SEC Docket 450, 2003
WL 22258425, at *2.
20 See Markovitz , 81 SEC Docket 450, 2003 WL 22258425, at *2 (“‘Late trading’
refers to the practice of placing orders to buy or sell mutual fund shares after 4:00
p.m. ET, the time as of which mutual funds typically calculate their NAV, but receiv-
ing the price based on the prior NAV already determined as of 4:00 p.m.”).
21 See id. (“[T]he late trader obtains an advantage—at the expense of the other
shareholders of the mutual fund—when he learns of information and is able to
purchase (or sell) mutual fund shares at prices set before  the information was
available.”).
22 For example, on August 12, 2004, Hewlett-Packard reported lower-than-ex-
pected net income, and its stock fell 14%, driving down the price of other tech stocks
and the NASDAQ Composite to its one-year low.  Dell’s stock declined $0.40/share.
After the market closed, however, Dell announced a 29% increase in second-quarter
profits.  The next day, the NASDAQ rose and Dell gained $1.39/share, or 4.2%. See
Tom Walker, Oil Prices, Not Profits, Driving Stocks , MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL,
Aug. 14, 2004, at 10C, available at  2004 WLNR 47010666.
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practical equivalent of buying them at a discount.  The late trader
sells the shares the next day and, assuming no subsequent
changes in the fund’s value, pockets a profit equal to the amount
of the discount.  Late traders typically have been hedge funds or
other large institutional traders that have developed relation-
ships with brokers who permit them to effect post-4:00 p.m.
purchases.23
Pricing arbitrage involves the purchase of a fund’s shares when
the shares are mispriced in violation of fund pricing rules.24  This
may occur, for example, when a fund invests in securities traded
on a foreign exchange that closes before the fund is priced at 4:00
p.m.  If an event occurs after the foreign exchange closes that
affects the value of the fund’s portfolio (“arbitrage event”), mar-
ket quotations for the fund’s portfolio are not readily available,25
and the fund accordingly must value its portfolio based on its
“fair value as determined in good faith by the [fund’s] board of
directors.”26  If the fund fails to fairly value its portfolio and in-
stead uses stale closing prices on the foreign exchange to calcu-
late its net asset value as of 4:00 p.m., then its price will be
inaccurate and in violation of the Investment Company Act.27  If
the arbitrage event reflects positively on the value of the fund’s
portfolio, the fund’s price will be too low, and purchasers will
buy the fund’s shares at a discount.28  If such purchasers sell their
23 See, e.g. , Banc of America Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., Exchange Act Release No.
51,167, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,756, 84 SEC Docket 2780, 2005
WL 310459, at *17 (Feb. 9, 2005) (broker permitted hedge fund to purchase fund
shares after 4:00 p.m.).
24 See supra  text accompanying notes 10-13.
25 See  Letter from Douglas Scheidt, Assoc. Dir. and Chief Counsel, Div. of Inv.
Mgmt., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, to Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst.,
at Part I.C (Apr. 30, 2001), available at  http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/ gui-
dance/tyle043001.htm. (“If the fund determines that a significant event has occurred
since the closing of the foreign exchange or market, but before the fund’s NAV
calculation, then the closing price for that security would not be considered a ‘read-
ily available’ market quotation, and the fund must value the security pursuant to a
fair value pricing methodology.”).
26 Id.
27 See supra  text accompanying notes 10–13.
28 Pricing arbitrageurs “take advantage of an upswing in the market and an ac-
companying increase in the net asset value of investment company shares by
purchasing such shares at a price which does not reflect the increase.”  Letter from
Douglas Scheidt to Craig S. Tyle, supra  note 25, at n.7 (“Low trading volume of
securities in some foreign markets raises issues as to the reliability of the market
quotations and can trigger the requirement to fair value price those securities.”).
The identification of the differences between price and value is, of course, precisely
the type of conduct in the marketplace that is normally rewarded, and some com-
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shares the next day, assuming no subsequent changes in the
fund’s value, they will pocket a profit equal to the amount of the
discount.  Pricing arbitrageurs have included retail and institu-
tional investors alike, as no special access to a fund-trading
mechanism is needed.29
The late trader’s and pricing arbitrageur’s profits come directly
from the pockets of the fund’s other shareholders.  Each form of
fund arbitrage effectively entails purchasing an interest in a pool
of securities at a discount, which dilutes the interests of the other
shareholders in the amount of the discount.  To illustrate, if a
fund had a net asset value of $10, with one shareholder who
holds the fund’s one outstanding share, and the fund mispriced
its portfolio and sold a second share to an arbitrageur for $5, the
first shareholder’s interest would be diluted.  After the transac-
tion, the fund will have a net asset value of $15 and two outstand-
ing shares, each of which will be worth $7.50.  The arbitrageur
will have paid $5 for an interest worth $7.50.  The first share-
holder’s share that was worth $10 is now worth $7.50.  His $2.50
loss matches precisely the arbitrageur’s $2.50 gain.
C. The Role of Portfolio Information in Fund Arbitrage
Fund arbitrageurs can benefit from knowing a fund’s portfolio
mentators have taken this view of pricing arbitrage as well. See, e.g. , Frank Partnoy,
The Real Mutual Fund Problem , SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 5, 2003, at B-7
(“Late trading and market timing are neither new nor the result of a change in cul-
ture at funds. Instead, this ‘arbitrage’ activity—buying low and selling high—is, and
long has been, a rational response to the once-a-day pricing rule.”).  “Mutual funds
are not markets, however, but cooperative enterprises in which shareholders are not
and should not be permitted to buy and sell shares at inaccurate prices.”  Bullard,
supra  note 18, at n.88.
29 For example, dozens of members of the Boilermakers Union engaged in pricing
arbitrage on a regular basis, with one member taking over $1 million in profits over
a three-year period. See  Administrative Complaint at Pts. II, V, VII, Putnam II ,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,412, 82 SEC Docket 2225, 2004 WL
865794 (Apr. 8, 2004) (No. E-2003-061) (discussing that frequent trading in 401(k)
funds by members of the Boilermakers Local Lodge No. 5 “was so prolific that the
last hour of the trading day became known internally as boilermaker hour at Put-
nam’s Norwood office”; 2.9% of plan participants accounted for “99% of the ex-
changes in International Voyager, 99% of the International Growth exchanges, and
98% of the money market exchanges”), available at  http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ sct/
sctpdf/putnamcomplaint.pdf; see also  Barry P. Barbash, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt.,
Remarks at the 1997 ICI Securities Law Procedures Conference (Dec. 4 1997) (tran-
script available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1997/ spch199.txt)
(“fairly large numbers of investors” attempted to exploit arbitrage opportunities);
Alan J. Wax, Fund Pricing ‘Fair,’ But Late , NEWSDAY, Oct. 31, 1997, at A69 (stating
that T. Rowe Price Funds used fair valuation procedures).
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holdings, but portfolio information often is not necessary and is
never by itself sufficient for fund arbitrage to succeed.  First,
arbitrageurs can more accurately predict the effect that market-
moving information will have on a fund’s portfolio if they know
what securities the portfolio holds.  The late trader needs to
know whether a fund holds the securities of companies that have
released market-moving information after the markets have
closed to determine whether the release of the information will
affect the value of the portfolio.30  For example, if Microsoft an-
nounces higher-than-expected earnings at 6:00 p.m., the late
trader needs to know whether the fund owns Microsoft shares to
determine whether purchasing the fund’s shares at its 4:00 p.m.
price would be a bargain.
Similarly, the pricing arbitrageur may need information about
the contents of a fund’s portfolio in order to determine whether
the arbitrage event occurring after the close of foreign markets
will affect the value of the portfolio.  For example, if positive re-
turns in the U.S. markets signal that Asian stock prices will open
higher the next day, the pricing arbitrageur needs to know
whether the fund owns Asian stocks to determine whether the
fund’s 4:00 p.m. price, which is based on the prior day’s closing
prices on the Asian exchanges, is too low.  The arbitrageur also
benefits from having more current portfolio information because
the more current the information, the greater the arbitrageur’s
certainty that the price he pays for the fund’s shares understates
its market value.
Second, traders may use portfolio information to construct de-
rivative positions that reduce their market risk.31  When arbi-
trageurs purchase fund shares, they take the risk that after the
purchase the value of the fund will fall, thereby saddling them
with a loss upon selling the shares the next day.  When Microsoft
makes a positive earnings announcement at 6:00 p.m., a late
trader can purchase shares of a fund that has a large position in
30 Although none of the SEC’s selective disclosure cases have included allegations
of late trading, its theory of the cases, and this Article’s critique thereof, applies
equally in the late trading context as in the pricing arbitrage context.
31 See Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No.
26,470, 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874 (June 21, 2004) (arbitrageurs used
portfolio information to “create derivative securities baskets that allowed them to
simulate short positions in the PBHG Funds and thereby create profitable hedging
transactions through other financial institutions”); Peter Elkind, The Secrets of Ed-
die Stern , FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 2004, at 106.
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Microsoft at the fund’s 4:00 p.m. price, but the trader cannot sell
those shares until 4:00 p.m. the next day.  The trader is exposed
to the market risk that Microsoft stock or other stocks in the
fund’s portfolio will decline in value the next day, which will
cause the fund’s NAV to decline from its previous day’s 4:00 p.m.
price, thereby leaving the trader with a loss.  An arbitrageur can
reduce or eliminate this market risk by taking a short position, as
of 6:00 p.m., in a basket of securities that matches the fund’s
holdings, which will offset any decline in the portfolio’s value af-
ter 6:00 p.m., thereby locking in the profit represented by the
difference between the fund’s 4:00 p.m. share price and its 6:00
p.m. value.
The typical arbitrage scenario involves a situation where fund
shares are underpriced, but portfolio information also can be
used to profit even when fund shares are overpriced.  An arbi-
trageur can use portfolio information to generate profits when
the fund’s net asset value is inflated (i.e., adverse arbitrage
events reflect negatively on the value of the fund’s portfolio), or
the market-moving information released after 4:00 p.m. is nega-
tive, by entering an order to purchase shares of the fund every
day by 4:00 p.m. and constructing a derivative short position in
the fund’s portfolio securities.  If there is an adverse arbitrage
event or a post-4:00 p.m. release of negative information, the
trader cancels the fund order and cashes out the now-profitable
short position.32  The arbitrageur can still profit if the arbitrage
event or post-4:00 p.m. information has a positive effect on the
portfolio by closing out the derivative position33 and pocketing
the gains realized upon selling the fund shares the next day.
Portfolio information is helpful, but by no means necessary, for
fund arbitrageurs to ply their trade.  For example, traders can
successfully arbitrage stale-priced Asian stock funds by simply
buying shares every day that the S&P 500 significantly rises, with
only the knowledge that the fund invests in Asian stocks and
without any special access to portfolio information, public or
32 See, e.g. , Powell, Exchange Act Release No. 51,017, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,722, 84 SEC Docket 2346, 2005 WL 53296, at *3 (Jan. 11, 2005) (late
trader engaged in “next–day busting,” i.e., canceling orders after 4:00 p.m. that had
been submitted before 4:00 p.m.).
33 As noted above, the arbitrageur might keep open a derivative position as a
hedge against a decline in the value of the fund’s portfolio between the time of the
arbitrageur’s purchase of fund shares and the time at which the arbitrageur sells the
shares the next day. See supra  text accompanying note 30.
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nonpublic.34  Even when portfolio information is helpful, the as-
sistance it provides does not depend on its having been selec-
tively disclosed.  Publicly available information about a fund’s
quarterly portfolio holdings, for example, is no less helpful to
arbitrageurs than selectively disclosed quarterly portfolio infor-
mation.  In practice, however, arbitrageurs may  benefit by access
to portfolio information that is provided more frequently (e.g.,
monthly) or that is more current information (e.g., thirty rather
than sixty days old) than information that is publicly available.
Such special access to portfolio information can be helpful, how-
ever, when the amount of the discount at which the arbitrageur
purchases the fund’s shares is small, and the added certainty pro-
vided by access to recent portfolio holdings may be decisive in an
arbitrageur’s decision as to whether the trade will be profitable.
Special portfolio access makes it easier to determine when profit-
able arbitrage opportunities are available.
Although fund portfolio information can be helpful, it is never
sufficient.  Successful fund arbitrage depends critically on the op-
portunity to purchase fund shares at a backward price (late trad-
ing) or a stale price (pricing arbitrage).  If neither opportunity
exists, access to fund portfolio information provides no useful in-
formation to the fund arbitrageur.  Neither access to nor disclo-
sure of fund portfolio information plays any role in the existence
of either arbitrage opportunity.
II
INSIDER TRADING ON MUTUAL FUND
PORTFOLIO INFORMATION
The Commission has used enforcement and regulatory mea-
sures to address the selective disclosure of portfolio information
to fund arbitrageurs.  As noted above, the Commission has
brought a number of enforcement actions on the ground that the
selective disclosure of portfolio information violated section
204A of the Investment Advisers Act.35  Section 204A generally
requires that investment advisers implement procedures that are
34 See  William N. Goetzmann, Zoran Ivkovich & Geert Rouwenhorst, Day Trad-
ing International Mutual Funds: Evidence and Policy Solutions , 10–11 (Yale Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. ICF-00-03, 2000), available at  http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=217168 (discussing that the strategy of buying stale-priced global equity fund
when the performance of the S&P 500 index was positive generated substantially
higher returns at lower risk).
35 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2000).
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designed to prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic informa-
tion by the adviser and its affiliates.  The Commission also
adopted new disclosure rules regarding the disclosure of funds’
policies and procedures relating to the disclosure of funds’ port-
folio information, which are discussed in Part III.
A. Background
There is a certain irony to the portfolio disclosure cases in that
funds are actually required to make their portfolio holdings pub-
licly available.  At the time of the conduct underlying the alleged
insider trading, funds were required to file with the Commission
and send to shareholders semiannual reports that included a list
of the funds’ portfolio holdings.36  This list had to be made public
within sixty days of the end of the fund’s reporting period, which
means that in most cases the information was about sixty days’
stale when it became public.  Most funds chose to make their
portfolio information public more frequently than required, with
a majority disclosing their portfolios quarterly and a substantial
percentage disclosing monthly.37  The Commission recently in-
creased the frequency with which funds are required to disclose
their portfolios from semiannually to quarterly.38  There are no
36 See id. § 80a-29(b)(2) (requiring that semiannual reports be filed with the Com-
mission); id.  § 80a-29(e) (requiring delivery of semiannual report to shareholders
that includes a balance sheet and a list of portfolio securities owned as of the date of
the balance sheet); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b2-1 (2005) (requiring filing of semiannual re-
port within ten days of transmission to shareholders); id.  § 270.30e-1 (requiring de-
livery of semiannual report to shareholders within sixty days of end of reporting
period).
37 See  Scott Cooley, The Case for Better Portfolio Disclosure , MORNINGSTAR ON-
LINE, Feb. 6, 2003, available at  http://news.morningstar.com/doc/article/
0,1,86497,00.html?_QSBPA=Y (stating that more than 70% of funds currently pro-
vide monthly or quarterly portfolio disclosure to Morningstar); Tom Lauricella &
Aaron Lucchetti, Silence is Golden to Mutual-Fund Industry , WALL ST. J., July 31,
2002, at C1 (stating that roughly 200 fund firms and seventeen of the twenty largest
funds provide quarterly or monthly holdings updates to investors); INV. CO. INST.,
SURVEY OF FUND GROUPS’ PORTFOLIO DISCLOSURE POLICIES SUMMARY OF RE-
SULTS (2001), available at  http://www.ici.org/statements/cmltr/01_sec_port_disclos_
surv.html (42% of fund groups surveyed disclose portfolio holdings more frequently
than semiannually).
38 See  17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-5 (requiring funds to file a quarterly report on Form
N-Q within sixty days of the end of the first and third fiscal quarters); SEC Form N-
Q, available at  http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-q.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2005) (form used for reporting quarterly portfolio holdings); S’holder Reports &
Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Mgmt. Inv. Cos., Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244 (Mar. 9, 2004) (requiring quarterly dis-
closure of portfolio holdings on Form N-Q for fiscal quarters ending after July 9,
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allegations in the SEC’s selective disclosure cases that fund man-
agers selectively disclosed nonpublic portfolio information more
frequently than monthly, which is the same frequency with which
many funds have disclosed their portfolios publicly.39
Further, it has been generally understood and accepted that
funds may disclose their portfolio holdings on a selective basis to
preferred investors or consultants.40  For example, financial plan-
2004).  The Commission also permitted funds to deliver a summary schedule of port-
folio information to shareholders, provided that the complete schedule was filed
with the Commission and was provided to shareholders upon request. Id.  In addi-
tion, section 13(f) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13f-1 thereunder require fund man-
agers that exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more in certain equity
securities to report on Form 13F the holdings of the accounts that they manage,
including the mutual funds. See  15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1
(2005).
39 See, e.g. , Banc One Inv. Advisors Corp., Investment Company Act Release No.
26,490, 83 SEC Docket 695, 84 SEC Docket 2404, 2004 WL 1472043 (June 29, 2004)
(access to monthly portfolios about five days after the end of the month); Alliance
II , Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket 3401, 2004 WL
67564 (Jan. 15, 2004) (one example of disclosure of one-day stale portfolio hold-
ings); Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470,
83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874 (June 21, 2004) (thirty-day stale monthly
portfolios disclosed).  There are no allegations in any cases that portfolio informa-
tion was updated more frequently than monthly, which is consistent with the prac-
tice of many funds to provide Morningstar and other third-party information
providers with nonpublic portfolio information on a monthly basis, see  Cooley,
supra note 37, and in some cases, there is little or no discussion of the staleness or
frequency of the disclosure, see, e.g. , Complaint, supra  note 2 (no discussion of fre-
quency or staleness); Putnam I , Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255, 81
SEC Docket 1913, 2003 WL 22683975 (Nov. 13, 2003) (same); Strong Capital
Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,448, 82 SEC Docket 3178, 2004 WL 1124933 (May 20, 2004) (monthly portfo-
lios disclosed with no discussion of staleness).  This arguably is not significant in the
Putnam  case because Putnam  involved trading only by insiders who apparently had
real-time access to portfolio holdings as a matter of course and there were no allega-
tions of selective disclosure.  In some exceptional cases, mutual funds have provided
daily, current, public access to their portfolios.  For example, the Community Intelli-
gence Fund and the OpenFund made their portfolios and trades publicly available
on an almost real-time basis. See  Bruce W. Fraser, Are “Naked” Funds Worth the
Wait? , CNBC.COM, Apr. 20, 2000.  Both funds closed in 2001. See  Justin Wiser, A
Jungle Out There: Community Intelligence Fund Latest Internet Victim , CB-
SMARKETWATCH.COM, Aug. 27, 2001,  http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?
guid=%7B70D6ABB8%2D13B3%2D46F3%2DB4BE%2DAE35371FDDBB%7D
&siteid=mktw; Craig Tolliver, Tech, Japan Funds Collapse in July: Stock Funds Leak
$500 Million in Latest Week , CBSMARKETWATCH.COM, Aug. 2, 2001, http://cbs.mar-
ketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid=%7B1E93FDFC%2DF80C%2D4BD3%2DAF8
C%2D6EEDB238183F%7D&siteid=mktw.
40 Such differential treatment of shareholders regarding the disclosure of fund
portfolio holdings was partly responsible for prompting consumer, professional, and
employee groups to petition the Commission to require more frequent disclosure of
fund portfolios. See, e.g. , Rulemaking Petition from the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
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ners and pension consultants with a large amount of client assets
invested in a fund may obtain a list of the fund’s portfolio hold-
ings upon request to assist their evaluation of the fund.41  The
Commission has found that “[m]ost funds regularly provide port-
folio information to service providers, such as custodians, admin-
istrators, securities lending agents, pricing services, and rating
agencies.”42  More than thirty percent of funds responding to an
SEC survey “appear to have disclosed portfolio information in
circumstances that may have provided certain fund shareholders
the ability to make advantageous decisions to place orders for
fund shares.”43  To date, the Commission has not described the
nature of these “advantageous decisions” other than in the con-
text of the kind of fund arbitrage activities discussed above.
The risks historically associated with portfolio disclosure, how-
ever, have not included the risk of exploitation by arbitrageurs.44
One common concern has been that traders could use portfolio
holdings to track which securities a fund is buying or selling and
trade ahead of, or “front run,” the fund’s trades.45  When a fund
(Jan. 18, 2001), available at  http://www.funddemocracy.com/Teamsters%20Petition.
htm; Rulemaking Petition from the AFL-CIO (Dec. 20, 2000), available at  http://
www.funddemocracy.com/AFL-CIO%20Petition.htm; Rulemaking Petition from
the Nat’l Ass’n of Investors Corp. (Oct. 9, 2000), available at  http://
www.funddemocracy.com/NAIC%20Petition.pdf; Rulemaking Petition from the
Consumer Fed’n of Am., et al. (Aug. 8, 2000), available at  http://www.funddemoc-
racy.com/Consumer%20Petition.pdf; Rulemaking Petition from the Fin. Planning
Ass’n (June 28, 2000), available at  http://www.funddemocracy.com/fpapetition.pdf;
Rulemaking Petition from Fund Democracy, L.L.C. (June 28, 2000), available at
http://www.funddemocracy.com/ Holdings%20Petition.pdf.
41 This is based on discussions between the author and financial planners and
other financial services professionals.
42 See, e.g. , Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and Interna-
tional Security, S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs , 108th Cong. 20 (2003) (state-
ment of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission), available at  http://hsgac.senate.gov/ _files/110303cutler.pdf.
43 Id.
44 Letter from Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Paul F. Roye, Dir.,
Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 17, 2001), http://www.ici.org/ state-
ments/cmltr/2001/01_sec_port_disclose_ltr.html; see  Russ Wermers, The Potential
Effects of More Frequent Portfolio Disclosure on Mutual Fund Performance , 7
PERSP. 1, 5-6 (2001), available at  http://www.ici.org/stats/res/per07-03.pdf.
45 Letter from Craig S. Tyle to Paul F. Roye, supra  note 44; Wermers, supra  note
44, at 1; see, e.g. , Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,798, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,798, 2002 WL 31499839, at *1 (Nov. 8, 2002)
(finding that personal trading in securities held by fund was misuse of information
under section 204A); Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 64 SEC Docket 1207, 1997 WL
206129, at *1 (Apr. 28, 1997) (stating that portfolio manager traded in securities
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is building a position in a stock, its purchases may cause the price
of the stock to rise; when it is liquidating a position, this effect is
reversed.  A trader with advance knowledge of a fund’s plans to
buy or sell a stock may herself buy or short the stock in anticipa-
tion of the effect of the fund’s trading on the stock’s price.  Such
front-running itself can cause the stock’s price to rise or fall
ahead of the fund’s purchases or sales, respectively, thereby in-
creasing the fund’s transaction costs.46  Although there is general
agreement that front-running is a real risk, there is substantial
disagreement about the point at which portfolio disclosure is fre-
quent or current enough to make it a material risk.47  Thus, the
risks of fund portfolio disclosure historically have been associ-
ated with traders using the information to trade securities held by
the fund,48 not securities issued by the fund, as occurs in the case
bought and sold by funds, including two that he managed); Honour, Investment
Company Act Release No. 21,385, 60 SEC Docket 1053, 1995 WL 579523, at *1
(Sept. 29, 1995) (same). See generally , Knight Sec. L.P., Exchange Act Release No.
50,867, 84 SEC Docket 1417, 2004 WL 2913488 (Dec. 16, 2004) (settling charges
against broker-dealer that used information about client trades to increase proprie-
tary trading profits); Ann Davis, Client Comes First? On Wall Street, It Isn’t Always
So , WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing Knight Securities); Susan Pulliam,
SEC Probes Firms That Gather Data on Who Owns What Shares , WALL ST. J., Dec.
8, 2004, at A1 (discussing disclosure of confidential trading data by securities
custodians).
46 This presumably was not a problem for the Community Intelligence Fund or
the OpenFund, see supra  text accompanying note 39, because their stock positions
were too small for their trading to affect the stock price.
47 Compare  Wermers, supra  note 44, with  S’holder Reports & Quarterly Portfolio
Disclosure of Registered Mgmt. Inv. Cos., Investment Company Act Release No.
26,372, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,244 (Mar. 9, 2004).
48 Another concern is that traders may use fund portfolio information to mimic a
fund manager’s portfolio and thereby “expropriate the results of proprietary re-
search and strategies that fund shareholders pay for.” See  Letter from Craig S. Tyle
to Paul F. Roye, supra  note 44, at Part II.A.2.  It is not clear how this harms the fund
independent of the front-running that it may entail, however, because to the extent
that other traders purchase securities after the fund has purchased them, the value
of the securities should rise, thereby benefiting the fund.  Indeed, the Commission
has brought a number of enforcement actions against persons who purchased a com-
pany’s stock before publicly endorsing the company in the hope that such “expropri-
ation” would occur  and their holdings would increase in value. See, e.g. , SEC v.
Park, Litigation Release No. 16,399, 2000 WL 4014, at *1 (Jan. 5, 2000) (charging
Internet-based service with recommending stocks without disclosing that the owner
traded in the same stocks prior to making the recommendation), settled , Litigation
Release No. 16,925, 2001 WL 224981 (Mar. 8, 2001); see also  SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (finding that failing to disclose purchases
of stocks immediately prior to recommending them to clients, known as “scalping,”
operated as a fraud upon clients under the antifraud provisions of Advisers Act);
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 54 (1966) (arguing
that investors are not harmed by scalping); Schotland, supra  note 4, at 1458–69
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of fund arbitrage.
B. Applicability of Section 204A to Selectively Disclosed
Portfolio Information
The Commission has charged a number of fund managers with
violating section 204A of the Advisers Act,49 which requires that
investment advisers:
[E]stablish, maintain, and enforce written policies and proce-
dures reasonably designed, taking into consideration the na-
ture of such investment adviser’s business, to prevent the
misuse in violation of [the Advisers Act, Exchange Act, or
rules under either] of material, nonpublic information by such
investment adviser or any person associated with such invest-
ment adviser.50
The Commission generally has asserted that the fund managers
misused nonpublic information about fund portfolio holdings by
selectively disclosing that information to fund arbitrageurs.51
Typically, fund managers provided hedge funds with a list of fund
portfolio holdings on a monthly basis without also disclosing that
information to the public at large.52
This Article argues that the selective disclosure of portfolio in-
formation to arbitrageurs did not in fact violate section 204A.
The selective disclosure of fund portfolio information to fund
arbitrageurs is not the kind of misuse of material, nonpublic in-
formation that section 204A was intended to prevent.53  Fund
(countering Manne’s argument that scalping does not harm investors).  Interestingly,
one of the newsletters at issue in Capital Gains  reported on changes in mutual
funds’ portfolios. See  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
608 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d and remanded , 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
49 See  15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2000).
50 Id.  A parallel provision imposed similar requirements on broker-dealers. See
id. § 78o(f); see also  NYSE, Inc., Rule 342.21 (2004), available at  http://
rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_11&manual=/
nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/ (requiring members to establish procedures “reasonably
designed to identify trades that may violate the provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the rules under that act or the rules of the Exchange prohibiting
insider trading and manipulative and deceptive devices”).
51 See, e.g. , Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No.
26,470, 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874 (June 21, 2004) (finding that an in-
vestment adviser violated section 204A by failing to implement procedures to pre-
vent the disclosure of nonpublic information about fund holdings that arbitrageurs
used to facilitate fund arbitrage).
52 See supra  note 38.
53 Contra DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18A INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, EN-
FORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 12:20 (Supp. 2004) (“SEC investigations indicated
that advisory personnel were using their knowledge of the make-up of the fund’s
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portfolio information is neither material nor nonpublic in the
sense that these terms are used in section 204A, and other provi-
sions of section 204A’s enacting legislation are inconsistent with
the view that section 204A applies to the disclosure of fund port-
folio information to fund arbitrageurs.  No regulator has ever
brought a case against anyone for engaging in the kind of insider
trading in mutual fund shares that the Commission asserts sec-
tion 204A’s policies and procedures must be designed to prevent.
Section 204A is part of the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA),54 which was enacted
in the wake of a series of high-profile insider trading cases
against Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, other Wall Street insiders,
and Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.55  None of these cases in-
volved trading shares of mutual funds or obtaining access to
funds’ current holdings.  The cases involved insider trading on
material, nonpublic information that related to the true value, as
opposed to the current market value, of securities issued by oper-
ating companies.56  All of the SEC’s prescandal section 204A
cases similarly involved the misuse of nonpublic, market-sensi-
portfolio to make more profitable ‘timing’ trades for their own accounts, or passing
on this sensitive information to favored hedge funds and others. This would be a
fairly straightforward violation under the misappropriation theory.”)
54 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub.
L. No. 100-704, § 3(b)(2), 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a
(2000)).  The ITSFEA was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on Novem-
ber 19, 1988. See generally  Barbara Bader Aldave, The Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal , 52 ALB. L. REV. 893
(1988); Michael J. Chmiel, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988: Codifying a Private Right of Action , 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 645 (1990);
Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 , 68 N.C. L. REV. 465 (1990); Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 , 45 BUS. LAW. 145 (1989).
55 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 7, 11–14 (1998), as reprinted in  1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044, 6048-51 (citing the Levine , Boesky , and Drexel  cases and
stating that the ITSFEA “represents the response of this Committee to a series of
revelations over the last two years concerning serious episodes of abusive and illegal
practices on Wall Street.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: EFFORTS TO DETECT, INVESTIGATE, AND DETER INSIDER TRADING (1988),
available at  http://161.203.16.4/t2pbat16/136893.pdf; LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 9-B-9, at n.765 (3d ed. 2004); Aldave, supra note 54, at
914–15; Chmiel, supra  note 54, at 658; Kaswell, supra  note 54, at 145-46.  Congress
was not satisfied with reforms adopted only four years earlier in the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984. See  Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff
(2000)). See generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra , § 9-B-9.
56 See generally  Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions ,
66 VA. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1980) (discussing survey of insider trading cases during period
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tive information about operating companies that could be used
to trade profitably in the companies’ shares or, in one case, infor-
mation about client trades used in connection with trades in the
same securities.57  None of these cases involved the misuse of
nonpublic information about a fund’s portfolio holdings.  These
prescandal cases properly reflect Congress’ intent that section
204A engender adequate supervision of investment adviser per-
sonnel who had “access to confidential, market-sensitive infor-
mation” about securities where the prices of the relevant
securities were sensitive to the “confidential, market-sensitive
information.”58
from 1966 to 1980 involving traders who traded on inside information about, for
example, projected earnings, proposed mergers, and forthcoming tender offers).
57 See  SEC v. Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,322, 81 SEC Docket 2952, 2003
WL 23303550 (Sep. 4, 2003) (settling charges against investment advisers that re-
ceived material nonpublic information about the U.S. Treasury’s decision to cease
issuance of the 30-year bond); Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
46,798, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,798, 2002 WL 31499839 (Nov. 8,
2002) (settling charges against investment adviser that traded on inside information
about purchases and sales in client accounts); DePrince, Race & Zollo, Inc., Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2035, 77 SEC Docket 2532, 2002 WL 1286223 (June
12, 2002) (settling charges against investment adviser that did not have procedures
designed to address its portfolio manager’s access to inside information as a director
of a company held in the manager’s portfolios); Wyser-Pratte, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 44,283, 74 SEC Docket 2073, 2001 WL 487946 (May 9, 2001) (settling
charges against investment adviser that did not have procedures designed to address
its access to material nonpublic information obtained through frequent contacts with
executives of companies involved in merger and takeover negotiations); Gabelli &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 35,057, 58 SEC Docket 443, 1994 WL 684627 (Dec.
8, 1994) (settling charges against investment adviser that did not have adequate pro-
cedures designed to address adviser’s CEO’s access to inside information as a direc-
tor of a company–the securities of which were traded in the investment adviser’s
portfolios).  Three cases have generally alleged a failure to adopt procedures de-
signed to prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic information without identifying
any specific, related conduct. See  Sharp, Exchange Act Release No. 35,215, 58 SEC
Docket 1547, 1995 WL 15885, at *4 (Jan. 11, 1995); Van Den Berg Baker, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 1414, 56 SEC Docket 1828, 1994 WL 192455, at *5
(May 12, 1994); Lynn Elgert, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1339, 52
SEC Docket 1614, 1992 WL 252172, at *3 (Sep. 21, 1992).
58 H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 21, as reprinted in  1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6058
(“[Section 204A] will promote more rigorous supervision of associated persons of
broker-dealers and investment advisers who have access to confidential, market-sen-
sitive information.  As a result, they will help to combat market abuses that consti-
tute the misuse of material, nonpublic information.”); see  SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that an insider’s duty “arises only in
‘those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reason-
ably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if [the
extraordinary situation is] disclosed ’” (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trad-
ing and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding , 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (1965) (emphasis added)); Selective Disclo-
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In contrast, mutual funds’ prices are not sensitive to the public
availability of information about their portfolio holdings.  Fund
prices cannot (legally) understate or overstate the true value of
their holdings, regardless of whether they are publicly dis-
closed.59  Mutual fund shares are not traded in a secondary mar-
ket in which new information might affect the price of the
security.60  A fund’s share price is fixed, which means that there
can be no inside information that, if publicly disclosed, would af-
fect the fund’s price.61
The mutual fund scandal does not involve trading on “mate-
rial, nonpublic information” as Congress used that term in sec-
tion 204A.  Information is “material” if there is a “substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security.”62  In traditional
insider trading cases, reasonable investors attach importance to
the inside information because it relates to the issuer’s true value
but is not reflected in the market price of the issuer’s securities.63
sure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release
No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug.
24, 2000) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Adopting Release ]
(explaining the need to regulate selective disclosure of material, nonpublic informa-
tion by operating companies:  “Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance
in this regard to ordinary ‘tipping’ and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few
gain an informational edge—and the ability to use that edge to profit—from their
superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or
diligence”).
59 See supra  text accompanying notes 11-14.
60 See supra  Part I.A.
61 See supra  Part I.A; Select Sector SPDR Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL
285555, at *20 (May 6, 1999) (“The distinction drawn by Congress between open-
end and closed-end funds [in exempting only open-end funds from section 16 report-
ing requirements, see infra  notes 106-107] may be based on the view that the ability
to exploit inside information is, at least in part, a function of the discrepancies that
may exist between market price and NAV.  An insider of an open-end fund gener-
ally would not be able to exploit inside information by buying or selling shares of the
fund on the basis of an anticipated change in the shares’ value because an open-end
fund is required to price its shares, and effect redemptions and sales of its shares, at
NAV.” (footnote omitted)).
62 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2005) (defining the term “material”); see  TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that material information creates
a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available”); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. , 401 F.2d at 850 (reasoning
that materiality turns on whether the information “would certainly have been an
important fact to a reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should
buy, sell, or hold”).
63 See, e.g. , SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant traded
on basis of company’s negative earnings forecasts prior to negative earnings an-
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Fund portfolio information reveals nothing about a fund’s true
value; that information is already captured in the fund’s NAV if
the fund’s NAV has been calculated in compliance with applica-
ble rules.  Access to fund portfolio information can be helpful to
arbitrageurs, but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient element
of successful arbitrage.64
Fund portfolio information is not material because there is no
“substantial likelihood that the disclosure of [the information]
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made availa-
ble.”65  Fund portfolio information is only useful to the pricing
arbitrageur who has gleaned from publicly available information
that the fund has mispriced its shares or to the late trader who
has determined from publicly available information that the
value of the fund’s portfolio securities has changed since the fund
was priced.  There is no likelihood, much less a substantial one,
that fund portfolio information would have any affect on a rea-
sonable investor’s opinion regarding the value of a mutual fund
unless one assumes that the reasonable investor is an arbitrageur.
Even for the fund arbitrageur, fund portfolio information does
not “significantly” alter the total mix of information made availa-
ble.  Although there may be instances in which an arbitrageur’s
investment decision might be tipped one way or the other based
on access to fund portfolio information, in this case it would be
“principally the skill of the [arbitrageur] that leads to the profit,
not simply his access to an insider.”66  Information about fund
portfolio holdings simply is not “material” information in the
sense intended in section 204A.
Nor is portfolio information “nonpublic” in the sense that
Congress used that term in section 204A.  In the classic insider
nouncement that preceded a forty percent decline in value of company’s stock). See
generally LANGEVOORT, supra  note 53, § 5:2 (“Economic theory teaches that price
of exchange-listed and other widely traded securities typically reflects a consensus
among investors about its fair value based on all available information.  A shorthand
definition of materiality for insider trading purposes, therefore, is any information
the disclosure of which would be likely to result in a substantial change in the price
of the security.”).
64 See supra  Part I.C.
65 TSC Indus. , 426 U.S. at 449.
66 LANGEVOORT, supra  note 53, § 5:3 (“For this reason, investment analysts can
properly elicit bits of information from company insiders and piece them together in
a mosaic that can lead to an investment decision, so long as the pieces of information
are not, standing alone, material. In that case, it is principally the skill of the analyst
that leads to the profit, not simply his access to an insider.”)
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trading context, whether the inside information is nonpublic is
critical.  Public disclosure of the information would eliminate the
insider’s informational advantage because the information would
soon be reflected in the price of the relevant security.67  In the
fund arbitrage context, however, whether the information is pub-
licly available makes little difference.  If a fund’s price is stale or
the fund permits late trading, the arbitrage opportunity is essen-
tially the same regardless of whether portfolio information is se-
lectively or publicly disclosed.  The only adverse consequence to
the arbitrageur of public disclosure is that this might increase the
number of arbitrageurs exploiting the stale price or late trading
opportunity, which might dilute potential arbitrage gains.68
Courts and commentators have often argued that insider trad-
ing should be prohibited based on the unfairness of permitting
privileged investors to trade on information to which all investors
do not have equal access.69  This unfairness is eliminated by pub-
lic disclosure.  But public disclosure of mutual fund holdings has
no effect on the availability or size of the fund arbitrage opportu-
nity.  Regardless of whether portfolio information is selectively
or publicly disclosed, the stale price remains stale, and the late
trade is still profitable.  The unfairness created by funds using
stale prices or permitting late trades is the same whether a select
67 See  Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime , 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1491, 1502–03 (1999) (“[D]isclosing the formerly non-public information
largely eliminates any windfall profit to be gained; once the market processes the
material information, the insider’s ability to exploit that information subsequently is
greatly diminished.”).
68 A hedge fund manager once stated to the author that his firm had ceased its
pricing arbitrage activities because so many investors were engaged in fund arbitrage
that the firm’s profit margins had declined.
69 See  SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The only
regulatory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally . . . .”);
Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)
(citing “inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing”). Contra  Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (rejecting equal access standard for insider trading
liability). See generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra  note 55, § 9-B-1(a)(i); Dennis W.
Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading , 35 STAN. L. REV.
857, 880–82 (1983) (discussing “fair play” conception of purpose of insider trading
prohibition); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law , 49
OHIO ST. L. J. 353, 359-60 (1988) (same); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Ana-
lysts and the Law of Insider Trading , 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1047–48 (1990) (same);
Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy , 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980) (same).  Technically, the other party to a transaction in
fund shares is the fund itself, which always has superior access to information about
its own portfolio.
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few, or the investing public at large, are able to fully exploit the
arbitrage opportunity.
Indeed, investors in funds that use stale prices arguably should
prefer, if there is going to be some disclosure of portfolio hold-
ings, that it be selective rather than public.  Public disclosure sim-
ply increases the likelihood that arbitrageurs will prey on the
fund because it makes it easier to determine when profitable ar-
bitrage opportunities are available.  At least in some cases, selec-
tive, rather than public, disclosure of portfolio holdings may
limit arbitrage to a smaller number of favored traders and result
in less total dilution of non-trading shareholders’ interests.70
The inapplicability of the ITSFEA to fund arbitrage is further
illustrated by some of its key provisions.  For example, the IT-
SFEA increased maximum penalties for persons and their con-
trol persons convicted of insider trading based on the amount of
“profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such [violations].”71
The ITSFEA defines the terms “profit gained” or “loss avoided”
as the “difference between the purchase or sale price of the se-
curity and the value of that security as measured by the trading
price of the security a reasonable period after public dissemina-
tion of the nonpublic information.”72  This conception of “profit
gained” or “loss avoided” is inapplicable to mutual funds be-
cause the release of nonpublic information about a mutual fund’s
portfolio holdings does not and legally cannot have any affect on
the price of the fund’s shares.73
The ITSFEA also granted a cause of action to contemporane-
70 This could be viewed as consistent with the efforts of many of the defendants in
the frequent trading and selective disclosure cases to permit some, but not all, arbi-
trageurs to engage in frequent trading. See, e.g. , Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs., Ltd.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470, 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL
1379874, at *3 (June 21, 2004) (finding that fund manager suspended trading by all
market timers except those related to two entities).  It is likely, however, that as the
number of arbitrageurs increases, the arbitrageurs shift from being professional trad-
ers with large accounts to retail investors with small accounts. See supra  note 67 and
accompanying text.  Thus, as the number of arbitrageurs increases, the average
amount each arbitrageur invests may decline, such that the aggregate dilution re-
mains unaffected.
71 Insider Trading and Securities Fund Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub.
L. No. 100-704, § 3(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4677, 4678 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2)-
(3) (2000)).
72 Id.  § 3(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(f) (2000)). See
generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra  note 55, § 9-B-9.
73 The ITSFEA also used the concept of the “profit gained or loss avoided” by the
trader as the measure of damages for claims brought by contemporaneous traders.
See supra  text accompanying notes 70-72.
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ous traders in insider trading cases.74  The ITSFEA amended sec-
tion 20A of the Exchange Act to provide that any person who
purchases or sells securities while in possession of material, non-
public information shall be liable to “any person who, contempo-
raneously with the purchase or sale of securities  that is the subject
of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based
on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a
purchase of securities) securities of the same class.”75  This cause
of action would not apply in the context of fund arbitrage be-
cause the harm is not done to persons who sell shares contempo-
raneously with the arbitrageur’s purchase, or who purchase
shares contemporaneously with the arbitrageur’s sale.  Purchas-
ing and selling shareholders do not purchase from or sell to other
investors; they only purchase from and sell to the fund itself.76
The persons who are harmed by the arbitrageur’s purchase are
holders, not purchasers or sellers, whose holdings are diluted by
the arbitrage.77  Holders do not have a cause of action under the
74 This provision was intended to overturn Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. , 719 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the Second Circuit denied recovery to the plaintiffs be-
cause the trader-defendant’s duty was owed not to the plaintiffs but to a third party.
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 26 (1988), as reprinted in  1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043,
6063. See generally  Aldave, supra  note 54, at 914–15; Chmiel, supra  note 54, at
660–61.
75 ITSFEA, § 5, 102 Stat. at 4680 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2000)) (empha-
sis added).
76 See supra  text accompanying note 14.
77 The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1988 (SLUSA) provided
that securities class actions alleging wrongdoing “in connection with the purchase or
sale” of a security shall be removable to federal court. See  Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 101, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227-28, 3230 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2000)).  A
number of courts have addressed the question of whether stale-pricing claims
brought by shareholders who held shares at the time that frequent trading occurred
satisfied SLUSA’s “in connection with the purchase or sale” requirement. See, e.g. ,
In re  Alger, Columbia, Janus, MFS, One Group, & Putnam Mutual Fund Litig., 320
F. Supp. 2d 352 (D. Md. 2004) (discussing but declining to rule on removal issue);
Bradfisch v. Templeton Funds, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (re-
jecting SLUSA removal on ground that complaint alleged dilution of ownership in-
terests and voting rights); Meyer v. Putnam Int’l Voyager Fund, 220 F.R.D. 127, 128-
29 (D. Mass. 2004) (rejecting SLUSA removal on ground that claim that defendants
violated their fiduciary duty was exclusively derivative and therefore excluded from
SLUSA removal, and allegations related to holders, not purchasers or sellers); Pot-
ter v. Janus Inv. Fund, No. 03-CV-0692-DRH, 2004 WL 1173201, at *2–*3 (S.D. Ill.
Feb. 12, 2004) (same); Vogeler v. Columbia Acorn Trust, No. 03-CV-0843-DRH,
2004 WL 1234135, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2004) (same); Kircher v. Putnam Funds
Trust, No. 03-CV-0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10327, at *7-*9 (S.D. Ill. Jan.
27, 2004) (same); Dudley v. Putnam Inv. Funds, No. 03-CV-853-GPM, at 3 (S.D. Ill.
Jan. 27, 2004) (same) (on file with author); Nekritz v. Canary Capital Partners,
L.L.C., No. 03-5081(DRD), 2004 WL 1462035, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2004) (expres-
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federal securities laws based on insider trading.78
Finally, the ITSFEA generally authorized additional sanctions
against any person who has violated the Exchange Act or its
rules by engaging in securities transactions while in possession of
material, nonpublic information or by communicating such infor-
mation “in connection with, a transaction on or through the facili-
ties of a national securities exchange  or from or through a broker
or dealer, and which is not part of a public offering by an issuer  of
securities other than standardized options.”79  Like the provi-
sions discussed immediately above, this provision also would not
apply to mutual funds because they are not traded on an ex-
change80 and are, technically, always sold as “part of a public of-
fering by an issuer.”81
An additional problem with the selective disclosure cases is
that no one has ever been charged with the kind of substantive
violation insider trading that the settling investment advisers
failed to prevent.  Insider trading occurs when a person trades
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information about
the securities that the trader knows was disclosed in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information.82  Thus, if an arbi-
trageur knows that the nonpublic fund portfolio information was
sing view that frequent trading satisfied SLUSA’s “in connection with” requirement
but declining to rule on removal); see also  Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., No.
Civ. A. 03-1236, 2003 WL 22466236, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2003) (finding breach of
contract based on fund’s instituting short term trading fees is subject to SLUSA);
Rahul Bhargava, Ann Bose & David A. Dubofsky, Exploiting International Stock
Market Correlations with Open-End International Mutual Funds , 25 J. BUS. FIN. &
ACCT. 765, 771 (1998).
78 See  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
79 ITSFEA, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4677 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1(a)(1) (2000)) (emphasis added).  The ITSFEA similarly expanded control-
ling-person liability for such violations provided the Commission could prove,
among other things, that the controlling person violated section 204A or section
15(f) of the Exchange Act. Id. § 3(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b) (2000)).
80 This provision would apply to exchange traded funds, which are mutual funds
that are traded on exchange. See generally supra  note 5.
81 Mutual fund shares are sold and redeemed by their issuer and are continuously
“in registration.” See  15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (generally requiring issuers of securi-
ties to sell shares only off of a current prospectus).
82 See  U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (actionable insider trading occurs
when a person misappropriates information obtained in breach of a duty owed to
the source of the information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (stating that
actionable insider trading by tippee occurs when the tippee knows the traded-on
information was obtained in breach of tipper’s duty to the source of the informa-
tion). See generally  Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O’Hagan Resolves Insider
Trading’s Most Vexing Problems , 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1998).
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disclosed in breach of the fund manager’s duty to the fund, the
arbitrageur would be guilty of insider trading, but no case against
any arbitrageur has ever been brought.83  The fact that the Com-
mission has never charged a fund arbitrageur with insider trading
suggests that it is unsure whether a court would agree that the
fund manager’s disclosure of the fund’s portfolio violated its duty
to the fund.  This failure further undermines the SEC’s position
that fund managers violated section 204A by failing to imple-
ment procedures to prevent the use of portfolio information for
the purpose of fund arbitrage.84
Finally, the SEC’s mutual fund insider trading cases contradict
its historical position that “trading in mutual fund shares posed
little risk of abuse, because those shares are priced at net asset
value daily.”85  Under both the Investment Company and Ad-
83 The Commission has charged some traders who were also insiders (portfolio
managers) with respect to the fund’s manager with violating the antifraud provisions
of the Advisers Act, which parallel Rule 10b-5. See, e.g. , Pilgrim Baxter & Assocs.,
Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470, 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL
1379874, at *3 (June 21, 2004); Jury Trial Demanded, SEC v. Scott, No. 03-12082-
EFH (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2003), available at  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/
comp18428.htm.  There is no indication, however, as to whether the Commission
would have found a violation in the absence of the insider’s preexisting fiduciary
duty as an investment adviser to the fund. See  Jury Trial Demanded, supra .  In
some cases, firms were charged with violating the Advisers Act’s antifraud provi-
sions, which might be interpreted as being based on a kind of tipper liability. See
Banc One Inv. Advisors Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,490, 83
SEC Docket 695, 84 SEC Docket 2404, 2004 WL 1472043 (June 29, 2004); Pilgrim
Baxter , 83 SEC Docket 363, 2004 WL 1379874, at *5; Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 82
SEC Docket 3178, 2004 WL 1124933, at *3, *11 (May 20, 2004).
84 The Commission and private litigants do have some recourse, however.  Late
traders can be prosecuted for violating the forward pricing rule. See, e.g. , Marko-
vitz, Exchange Act Release No. 48,588, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,201, 81 SEC Docket 450, 2003 WL 22258425, at *4 (Oct. 2, 2003).  But liability of
pricing arbitrageurs may be limited to civil claims based on, for example, the com-
mon law cause of action for overpayments. See  Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annota-
tion, Recovery by Bank of Money Paid Out to Customer by Mistake , 10 A.L.R.4th
524 (1981).
85 Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040 (Jan. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Codes of Ethics Proposing
Release] (citing Prevention of Certain Unlawful Activities with Respect to Regis-
tered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 11,421, 45 Fed.
Reg. 73,915 (Nov. 7, 1980)) (adopting Rule 17j-1 and stating that mutual fund shares
“present very little opportunity for the type of improper trading that [Rule 17j-1] is
intended to cover”).  In contrast, section 17(j) of the Investment Company Act and
Rule 17j-1 are intended to address the use of fund portfolio information for front-
running. See  Personal Investment Activities of Investment Company Personnel and
Codes of Ethics of Investment Companies and Their Investment Advisers and Prin-
cipal Underwriters, Securities Act Release No. 7212, Investment Company Act Re-
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viser Acts, the Commission has adopted rules requiring that fund
managers and other investment advisers keep records of their
employees’ securities transactions for the purpose of detecting
and deterring trading that may harm funds and other advis ory
clients.86  In SEC Rule 17j-1, which requires the reporting of per-
sonal securities transactions by personnel of mutual fund affili-
ates, the Commission expressly excluded transactions in mutual
fund shares87 because “shares of open-end funds would appear to
present little opportunity for the type of improper trading that
Rule 17j-1 is intended to cover.”88  For the same reason, the
Commission excluded transactions in mutual fund shares from
Rule 204-2, which requires that investment advisers keep records
of certain employees’ securities transactions.89  The Commission
took the same position when it adopted Regulation FD, which
generally prohibits the selective disclosure by issuers of material,
nonpublic information, but which expressly excludes mutual
funds from its coverage.90  The Commission excluded mutual
funds from Regulation FD because they:
[A]re continually offering their securities to the public . . . and
are not permitted to sell, redeem, or repurchase their securi-
ties except at a price based on their securities’ net asset
value. . . . [W]e believe that Regulation FD would offer little
additional protection to investors in these types of investment
companies and therefore they should be excluded from its cov-
lease No. 21,341, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,844 (Sept. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Personal
Investment Activities Proposing Release].  Like Rule 17j-1, Rule 204-2 under the
Advisers Act previously excluded mutual fund shares from reporting requirements
for certain investment advisory personnel. See  17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(12)(i)(B)
(2005).
86 See generally Personal Investment Activities Proposing Release, 60 Fed. Reg. at
47,849.
87 See  17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(a)(4), (d) (2005).
88 Personal Investment Activities Proposing Release, 60 Fed. Reg. at 47,851.
89 See  17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(12)(i)(B), (13)(i)(B) (2005) (excluding mutual
fund shares from reporting requirements for investment advisers); Personal Invest-
ment Activities Proposing Release, 60 Fed. Reg. at 47,851; Personal Investment Ac-
tivities of Investment Company Personnel and Codes of Ethics of Investment
Companies and their Investment Advisers and Principal Underwriters, Securities
Act Release No. 7728, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,958, 64 Fed. Reg.
46,821 (Aug. 27, 1999) (adopting release amending Rule 204-2 to exclude transac-
tions in fund shares for the same reason it excluded such transactions from Rule 17j-
1).
90 See  17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2005) (defining “issuer” generally to exclude mu-
tual funds under Regulation FD’s selective disclosure rule); see also  Selective Dis-
closure and Insider Trading Adopting Release, Securities Act Release No. 7881,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 57,719 (Aug. 24, 2000).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-JAN-06 10:54
Insider Trading in Mutual Funds 847
erage . . . .91
After a quarter-century of maintaining publicly that insider
trading on mutual funds does not pose a threat to funds, the
Commission has changed its position by instituting proceedings
against funds for failing to prevent the disclosure of portfolio in-
formation used to facilitate fund arbitrage.  The Commission pro-
vided no direct or indirect warning of this policy shift; for
example, the amendments to rules requiring investment advisers’
employees to report trades in mutual fund shares were adopted
after the conduct on which the selective disclosure cases have
been based occurred.92  When the Commission proposed in 2002
to require funds to disclose their portfolios more frequently, it
nowhere mentioned the issue of whether more frequent disclo-
sure might facilitate fund arbitrage,93 yet it now argues that in-
vestment advisers should have known to limit the disclosure of
fund portfolio information to prevent such arbitrage.
C. Insider Trading on Other Selectively Disclosed
Fund Information
The foregoing analysis should not be read to suggest that there
is no fund-related information that could ever qualify as material,
nonpublic information for the purposes of section 204A.  As dis-
91 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7787, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,597 (Dec. 28,
1999) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Proposing Release].
92 See  Investment Advisor Codes of Ethics, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a)(3), (b),
(e)(9), (e)(10) (2005) (requiring record of holdings and transactions in funds advised
by the adviser or by a control affiliate of the adviser); Investment Adviser Codes of
Ethics, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (July 9,
2004) [hereinafter Codes of Ethics Adopting Release]; Codes of Ethics Proposing
Release, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040 (Jan. 27,
2004); see also  Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advis-
ers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(extending Rule 204A-1 compliance date to February 1, 2006).  The Commission did
not make a conforming amendment to Rule 17j-1 because in section 17(j) of the
Investment Company Act, Congress authorized the Commission to prohibit only
“fraud or deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of ‘any security
held or to be acquired’” by a fund and not the purchase or sale of securities issued
by the fund.  Codes of Ethics Proposing Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040.  Notwithstand-
ing the SEC’s view that Congress wrote section 17(j) so as not  to authorize it to
require reporting on mutual fund share transactions, the Commission decided that it
had the authority “to close [this] regulatory gap” by requiring such reporting under
Rule 204A-1.” Id.
93 Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Manage-
ment Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8164, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 25,870, 68 Fed. Reg. 160 (Jan. 2, 2003).
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cussed above, a fund manager’s failure to adopt policies and pro-
cedures designed to prevent the disclosure of material, nonpublic
portfolio information could trigger section 204A liability to the
extent that the portfolio information could be used by traders to
front-run fund transactions.94  The fund industry has argued that
fund portfolio information provided monthly or even quarterly
could enable a trader to identify patterns of purchases and sales
and use that information to front-run a fund’s transactions.95
This contention is suspect, as none of the SEC’s selective disclo-
sure cases included allegations that arbitrageurs were exploiting
their special access to fund portfolio information to front-run
fund trades, even though the portfolio information was provided,
according to the fund industry, frequently enough to permit prof-
itable front-running.96  If arbitrageurs could have used such ac-
cess to front-run fund trades profitably, they probably would not
have ignored this profit opportunity.
A section 204A misuse of material, nonpublic information is
more likely to occur when a fund manager selectively discloses
information about the fund’s transactions (as opposed to its port-
folio holdings), and the information is used to front-run the
fund’s trades.97  Recent reports of front-running on the basis of
confidential information about trading activities suggest that this
may become a significant focus for the section 204A policies and
procedures of funds whose trades may have a material effect on
market prices.98  Indeed, one of the SEC’s recent mutual fund
94 Alliance II , Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312A, 81 SEC Docket
3401, 2004 WL 67564 (Jan. 15, 2004).  Although the inside information relates to
market activity rather than company operations, it still shares some of the character-
istics of traditional notions of insider trading.  Publicizing the insider information
would have a direct effect on the price at which the relevant securities were traded
by moving them toward a price that more accurately reflects (or anticipates) actual
demand and supply. See generally LANGEVOORT, supra  note 53, § 11:7 (discussing
insider trading liability for front-running).  This dynamic also occurs in traditional
insider trading but not in late trading or pricing arbitrage because future prices of
mutual funds are set independent of the demand for fund shares. See supra  text
accompanying notes 10-13.
95 See supra  note 44.
96 See supra  note 39.
97 See supra  text accompanying notes 45-48.
98 See, e.g. , Complaint at 1, SEC v. Furino, No. 05-1259 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005)
(alleging floor broker was compensated by day trader for providing confidential,
real-time information about customers’ orders), available at  http://www.sec.gov/ liti-
gation/complaints/comp19126.pdf; see also  Kate Kelly & Deborah Solomon, SEC
Preps ‘Best-Price’ Overhaul , WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at C1 (expressing fund
manager’s concerns that trade-through rule mandating that orders be executed at
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cases charged two portfolio managers with violating the antifraud
provisions of the Advisers Act by trading fund shares while in
possession of confidential information about, inter alia , the
fund’s transactions,99 and the fund managers’ related section
204A violation was based, in part, on the selective disclosure of
the fund’s transactions.100  The portfolio managers did not use
this information to front-run fund trades, however, but rather to
decide whether to invest in the fund.101  Basing insider trading
charges on the failure to protect against the use of transaction
information to trade in fund shares (rather than to front-run fund
portfolio transactions) is problematic because, like portfolio in-
formation, transaction information provides no additional insight
into the future value of the fund.  Access to transaction informa-
tion facilitates the identification of arbitrage opportunities in the
same way that access to portfolio information can be used for this
purpose.  Thus, selective disclosure of fund transaction informa-
tion to persons who are using it to front-run fund transactions
probably would support a section 204A case, whereas disclosure
to persons who trade only in fund shares might not.
When might a section 204A violation occur in connection with
trading in securities issued by the fund rather than securities held
by the fund?  Section 204A should support such a claim when the
fund manager fails to have policies and procedures designed to
prevent the release of nonpublic information about the fund’s
portfolio security valuations .  If a fund used a flawed methodol-
ogy in pricing its securities that resulted in undervalued shares in
violation of fund pricing rules and information about the use of
that methodology was leaked to a trader, the trader could use the
information to identify pricing arbitrage opportunities.  In this
case, the information relates directly to the validity of the fund’s
price, just as inside information about an operating company’s
the best price may reveal large trades and adversely affect execution); Kara Scan-
nell, Aaron Lucchetti & Susanne Craig, ‘Squawk Box’ Figure is Aiding Federal
Probe , WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2005, at C1 (describing investigation of traders using
access to confidential communications among Wall Street firms to front-run trades
by mutual funds and other institutional investors).
99 See  Jury Trial Demanded, SEC v. Scott, No. 03-12082-EFH, ¶¶ 2, 15, 19, 34-41
(D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2003) (also alleging trading while in possession of information
about fund portfolio holdings and valuations), available at  http://www.sec.gov/ litiga-
tion/complaints/comp18428.htm.
100 See Putnam I , Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255 , 81 SEC Docket
1913, 2003 WL 22683975 (Nov. 13, 2003).
101 Jury Trial Demanded, supra  note 99, ¶¶ 19, 20, 25, 26.
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prospects relates to whether the company’s stock price accurately
reflects its true value.  The valuation information tells the trader
that the current day’s price will not be accurate, and the next
day’s price probably will be higher, just as inside information
about a company’s positive prospects tells the trader that the
company’s stock’s current market price understates its value, and
the price will rise when the information is made public.
The Commission also has based two section 204A cases in part
on the selective disclosure of valuations.102  In recent SEC
rulemaking releases discussing appropriate section 204 policies
and procedures, however, the Commission has not mentioned
the need to protect against the misuse of valuation information;
rather, it has only discussed the misuse of portfolio holding and
transaction information.103  Yet it is the misuse of valuation infor-
mation that poses the greatest risk of arbitrage losses.  The Com-
mission previously has brought cases involving insider trading
based on inside knowledge of the mispricing of a mutual fund,
and these cases probably would be best argued on the theory that
the insiders had access to inside information about valuations.104
102 See Putnam I , 81 SEC Docket 1913, 2003 WL 22683975; Pilgrim Baxter &
Assocs., Ltd., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470, 83 SEC Docket 363,
2004 WL 1379874 (June 21, 2004).
103 See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300, 22,305-07 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Market Timing
Adopting Release].  Nor does the SEC’s discussion of funds’ compliance procedures
relating to the protection of nonpublic fund information mention valuations. See
Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,719 (Dec. 24, 2003)
[hereinafter Compliance Programs Adopting Release].  One might even argue that
the selective disclosure of portfolio information by itself could be subject to section
204A to the extent that it could be used to determine whether the fund was mis-
priced, but this information probably is not material because it is only indirectly
related to fund pricing. See supra  text accompanying notes 61–63.
104 These cases do not involve fund arbitrage; instead, they are situations in which
insiders had inflated the value of the fund in order to conceal losses. See, e.g. , De-
mand for Jury Trial, SEC v. Heartland Advisors, Inc., No. 03-C-1427 (E.D. Wisc.,
Dec. 11, 2003), available at  http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/ comp18505.htm
(charging fund manager and its executives with mispricing violations).  In 1994, the
Commission sued the directors of a money market fund and employees of the fund’s
sub-adviser in connection with the mispricing of a money market fund. See
Backlund, Securities Act Release No. 7626, Investment Company Act Release No.
23,639, 68 SEC Docket 2663, 1999 WL 8164 (Jan. 11, 1999) (charging directors with
mispricing fund); Vanucci, Securities Act Release No. 7625, Investment Company
Act Release No. 23,638, 68 SEC Docket 2661, 1999 WL 81620 (Jan. 11, 1999) (charg-
ing sub-adviser’s employees with mispricing fund).  Some shareholders in the fund
sued other shareholders who redeemed their shares before the fund’s price was cor-
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Some have suggested that insider trading could result from
knowing that a fund held a stock about which negative news had
been released.105  Assuming that the information about the port-
folio company is public, knowing that the fund had bought or
sold that company’s stock could not benefit a trader because the
negative information would be incorporated in the fund’s 4:00
p.m. price.  If the company information was nonpublic, a trader
presumably could use a mutual fund as an indirect vehicle
through which to engage in insider trading in the company’s
shares.  In some cases, a fund may have invested enough of its
assets in a single company’s stock to provide a profitable vehicle
for an insider to use the fund to trade on inside information
about the company.106  In this scenario, section 204A might re-
quire the fund manager of a concentrated fund to adopt proce-
dures that either prevent selective disclosure to portfolio
company insiders or prohibit such insiders from investing in the
fund.
It is ironic that a fund manager might be liable under section
204A for selectively disclosing its portfolio to a company insider
when the insider was expressly exempted from reporting transac-
tions in the fund’s shares under section 16(a) of the Exchange
Act,107 which generally requires company insiders to report their
transactions in company securities for the purpose of deterring
insider trading.108  One might argue that no trader would ever
follow this insider trading strategy because it would be less prof-
itable than buying the stock directly, as the trader’s investment
would be spread across the fund’s entire portfolio and her profit
accordingly diluted, but this strategy would have the advantage
of legally evading section 16(a)’s reporting requirements.
rected on the ground that they had possession of material, nonpublic information
about the fund’s mispricing.  Robert McGough, SEC Probes Insider Trading At
Money Fund , WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at C1.
105 See, e.g. , Christopher Oster, Forcing Managers to Reveal Fund Stakes , WALL
ST. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at R1.
106 Microsoft stock is one of the most widely held stocks in equity mutual funds,
with some fund portfolios holding more than ten percent of their assets in the stock.
See  Ian McDonald, How Plan May Affect Investors , WSJ.COM, July 21, 2004.
107 See  15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(B) (2000) (exempting securities issued by registered
investment companies from registration under section 12 of the Exchange Act); id.
§ 78p(a) (requiring reporting by certain persons of beneficial ownership in securities
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16(a)(5)(ii) (2005)
(excluding interests in portfolio securities held by registered investment companies
from interests deemed to confer beneficial ownership for purposes of section 16).
108 See generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra  note 55, § 6-E-1.
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Although this Article focuses on insider trading of mutual
funds, it is relevant to consider briefly insider trading in ex-
change-traded funds (ETFs).  Exchange-traded funds technically
are mutual funds because they are open-end funds that issue re-
deemable securities,109 but unlike conventional mutual funds,
their shares are traded in the secondary market.  This secondary
market trading creates interesting new possibilities for insider
trading in ETF shares.  While ETF shares trade in the secondary
market like other stocks, the funds themselves sell and redeem
their shares only in large aggregations (“creation units”).110  An
ETF’s market price typically tracks its per share NAV closely be-
cause arbitrage activity provides a kind of disciplining mecha-
nism.111  For example, if an ETF’s market price falls below its per
share NAV, arbitrageurs buy shares with the knowledge that
once they have accumulated enough shares to form a creation
unit, the fund must redeem the creation unit at the higher per
share NAV.  This kind of fund arbitrage, ironically, benefits
shareholders by providing a liquid, exchange-traded pool of se-
curities that does not trade at a discount to its net asset value.112
There are situations, however, in which nonpublic information
about an ETF’s internal operations could be used to anticipate
changes in its market price,113 and trading on such information
could constitute insider trading.114  An ETF manager’s failure to
109 See  15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1).
110 See supra  note 5.
111 Exchange-traded funds may trade at market prices that deviate from their per
share NAVs, however. See generally  Memorandum from Fund Democracy, L.L.C.
in Support of Hearing Request (May 4, 2000) (arguing that ETFs should be required
to disclose discrepancies between trading and market prices), http://
www.funddemocracy.com/Supporting%20Memo.pdf.
112 In contrast, closed-end funds, which are investment companies that trade in
the secondary market but do not offer redeemable securities, see  15 U.S.C. § 80a-
5(a)(1)-(2), often trade at substantial discounts to their per share NAV, see generally
Matthew I. Spiegel, Closed-End Fund Discounts in a Rational Agent Economy  (Feb.
5, 1999), http://som.yale.edu/~spiegel/closedend/cef.pdf.
113 For example, in 1994, Malaysia WEBS, an ETF that invests in stocks traded on
the Kuala Lumpur Exchange, traded at substantial discounts to its NAV, see  Pre-
mium/Discount for Malaysia WEBS (May 4, 2004), http://www.funddemocracy.com/
MalaysiaGraph.pdf, and these discounts were affected, in part, by internal decisions
regarding the exchange rate used by the fund, see  Prospectus, WEBS Index Fund,
Inc. (supp. Feb. 17, 1999), http://www.sec.gov/ Archives/edgar/data/930667/
0000940400-99-000052.txt (using exchange rate other than the rate established by the
Malaysian government).
114 Transactions in exchange-traded funds, unlike transactions in other mutual
funds, are subject to reporting under section 16 of the Exchange Act. See  15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(b) (requiring companies with securities traded on an exchange to register
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protect against such misuse accordingly could violate section
204A.
Each of the foregoing mutual fund insider trading scenarios
presents a stronger case under section 204A than the SEC’s se-
lective portfolio disclosure cases, but courts still might deem
none of them to constitute the kind of “misuse” that section
204A was intended to address.  To violate section 204A, the in-
vestment adviser must have failed to protect against the kinds of
“misuse” that the section was intended to prevent.  If this misuse
must involve traditional insider trading, as argued above,115 the
Commission would have to persuade a court that the various sce-
narios described above involve insider trading.  The scope of con-
duct deemed to constitute insider trading has been largely
defined by the courts under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,116 and courts in recent years have
been reluctant to expand established private causes of action
under the federal securities laws.117  Courts therefore may reject
under section 12 of the Exchange Act); id.  § 78p(a) (requiring reporting by certain
persons of beneficial ownership in securities registered under section 12 of the Ex-
change Act).  The SEC staff has stated that it would not recommend that the Com-
mission institute an enforcement action if a section 16 beneficial owner of shares of
an ETF did not file reports under section 16 provided that the market price of the
fund did not deviate materially from its NAV. See  Select Sector SPDR Trust, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 285555, at *20 (May 6, 1999).
115 See supra  text accompanying notes 59-69.
116 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra  note 55, § 9-B-3 (regarding evolution of substan-
tive law under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:  “That law, of course, is federal: the
‘federal common law’ of which Judge Friendly and others have spoken as forming a
penumbra around every federal statute.  In theory the courts are merely construing
a statute and rule. But when the statute and rule are, like § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
virtually as vague as the Due Process Clause, the law is surely as much judge made
as is the classic common law of the states.” (footnote omitted)); Seligman, supra
note 82, at 2 (claiming that there is no evidence that Congress was thinking about
trading by insiders in enacting section 10(b) and that “[i]t has . . . been up to the
courts to decide precisely which persons should” be subject to insider trading
liability).
117 After an initial period of expansive interpretation of causes of action under the
federal securities laws, the Supreme Court entered on a substantial narrowing of its
earlier jurisprudence, and recent cases generally have not disturbed this second
stage opposition to an expansive creation or expansion of such private rights. See  E.
Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust , 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1579-84
(2004) (describing different stages in the Supreme Court’s positions on private rights
of action under the federal securities laws).  There have been exceptions, however,
such as the late-stage decisions in Basic Inc. v. Levinson , 485 U.S. 224 (1988), and
United States v. O’Hagan , 521 U.S. 642 (1997), which expanded private rights of
action, the latter specifically with respect to the law of insider trading. Id.  at 1583.
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expanding the definition of insider trading to include purchases
and redemptions of mutual fund shares based on inside informa-
tion about the funds.118
Courts also may be particularly leery of imposing duties to
adopt procedures that the Commission historically has suggested
were unnecessary119 and lack a clear source of law, especially
where the Commission has declined to bring charges either
against the insider traders/arbitrageurs themselves or fund man-
agers for aiding and abetting funds’ violations of express statu-
tory mandates such as the fair value pricing.  While the
Commission has brought a number of cases against funds for per-
mitting late trading,120 it has never taken action against a fund
for permitting pricing arbitrage (i.e., using stale prices).  Late
trading and stale pricing violate express, specific, statutory du-
ties, in contrast with the implied, general obligation the Commis-
sion argues is imposed by section 204A that fund managers must
prevent selective disclosure of fund portfolio information that
may be used to facilitate insider trading in mutual fund shares.
III
DISCLOSURE OF PORTFOLIO DISCLOSURE POLICIES
The SEC’s new rules regarding funds’ portfolio disclosure poli-
cies121 follow the same misguided logic as the SEC’s selective dis-
118 See  Monetta Fin. Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 390 F.3d 952, 955-57 (7th Cir. 2004) (find-
ing that the fund president did not violate duty to disclose allocations of IPOs to
fund directors, which was material information, because he was not aware that dis-
closure was required, that the SEC had not adopted a rule requiring such disclosure,
and that the allocations were not inequitable). But see SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200 (1963) (stating that adviser’s failure to disclose
material information is fraud under Advisers Act, regardless of whether “elements
of technical common-law fraud—particularly intent—[have been] established”).
119 See supra  text accompanying notes 85-93.
120 See, e.g. , Markovitz, Exchange Act Release No. 48,588, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,201, 81 SEC Docket 450, 2003 WL 22258425 (Oct. 2, 2003).
121 In Codes of Ethics Adopting Release, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696 (July 9, 2004), the Commission adopted Advisers Act
Rule 204A and amended Advisers Act Rule 204-2 and Investment Company Act
Rule 17j-1. See  17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2005) (adopting new rule requiring regis-
tered investment advisers to adopt a code of ethics that includes, inter alia , provi-
sions regarding the reporting by certain persons of personal securities holdings and
transactions, including securities issued by certain affiliated mutual funds); id.
§ 275.204-2(a)(12)(i)–(iii), (a)(13)(i)–(iii), (e)(1) (amending recordkeeping rule to
require maintenance of a copy of the code of ethics and records relating to holdings
and transactions, pursuant to Rule 204A-1); id.  § 270.17j-1(a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(i),
(a)(11), (d)(1), (d)(2)(iv)–(v) (amending requirements regarding contemporaneity
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 35 30-JAN-06 10:54
Insider Trading in Mutual Funds 855
closure cases:  that regulating portfolio disclosure policies
provides an effective means of combating fund arbitrage.  As dis-
cussed above, selective portfolio disclosure is at most only inci-
dentally related to fund arbitrage, which is, in fact, enabled
primarily by late trading opportunities and stale prices.
Previously, funds were not required to disclose their portfolio
disclosure policies, and their policies were not substantively regu-
lated.122  Funds are now required to provide in their Statements
of Additional Information (SAI), which is a part of a fund’s re-
gistration statement,123 a detailed description of the fund’s poli-
cies and procedures regarding the disclosure of portfolio
holdings.124  The disclosure must include, inter alia , the terms
under which portfolio information is selectively disclosed125 and
the process for determining whether such selective disclosure is
of personal holdings and transactions reports and expanding category of persons
subject to reporting requirements).  In Market Timing Adopting Release, Securities
Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg.
22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004), the Commission revised Form N-1A, the registration state-
ment for mutual funds. See  Form N-1A, Item 4(d), available at  http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms (requiring prospectus to state that the fund’s portfolio disclosure policy
is described in its Statement of Additional Information and on its website); id.  at
Item 11(f) (setting forth requirements for disclosure of fund portfolio disclosure pol-
icies, see infra  note 126).  In Compliance Programs Adopting Release, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, (Dec. 24, 2003), the Commis-
sion adopted Rule 38a-1. See  17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2005) (requiring that mutual
fund boards adopt “policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent” viola-
tions of the federal securities laws, including policies and procedures that address
disclosure of fund portfolio, trading strategy, and transaction information and trans-
actions by fund personnel in fund shares based on such information).
122 For example, when the Commission issued its proposal to require more fre-
quent disclosure of fund portfolio information in December 2002, it did not mention
the potential harm caused by selective disclosure, much less the issue of what infor-
mation should be required to be disclosed about selective disclosure. See supra  text
accompanying note 93.
123 The mutual fund registration statement includes three parts:  Part A: The Pro-
spectus; Part B: Statement of Additional Information (SAI), and Part C: Other In-
formation (e.g., exhibits).  The prospectus must be provided to investors at or before
the completion of a fund purchase. See  17 C.F.R. § 230.134b (2005).  The SAI must
be provided only upon the request of the investor. See  Form N-1A, supra  note 121,
at Item 1(b)(1), Instruction 3.
124 See  Form N-1A, supra  note 121, at Item 4(d).
125 Funds are not required to disclose selective disclosure arrangements to the
extent that the fund’s portfolio is disclosed on its website. See  Market Timing
Adopting Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,307.  The Commission stated that filing the
information with Commission would not be sufficient for this purpose. Id.  In con-
trast, the Commission took the position in adopting Regulation FD that disclosure
of company information on a Web site would not by itself qualify as “public disclo-
sure” for purposes of the rule.  Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Adopting
Release, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Invest-
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in the best interests of fund shareholders.126
The Commission also required that fund advisers’ compliance
procedures include provisions designed to prevent access to ma-
terial, nonpublic information about client holdings and transac-
tions, and implied that these procedures must satisfy certain
substantive standards.  New Rule 38a-1 under the Investment
Company Act generally requires fund advisers to adopt codes of
ethics and specifically requires that the codes include or incorpo-
rate by reference procedures designed to prevent access to mate-
rial, nonpublic information about client holdings and
transactions.127  The Commission also amended the investment
ment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,723-24 (Aug. 24,
2000).
126 Specifically, the SAI must disclose:
How the policies and procedures apply to disclosure to different categories
of persons, including individual investors, institutional investors, in-
termediaries that distribute the fund’s shares, third-party service providers,
rating and ranking organizations, and affiliated persons of the fund.
Any conditions or restrictions placed on the use of information about port-
folio securities that is disclosed, including any requirement that the infor-
mation be kept confidential or prohibitions on trading based on the
information, and any procedures to monitor the use of this information.
The frequency with which information about portfolio securities is dis-
closed, and the length of the lag, if any, between the date of the informa-
tion and the date on which the information is disclosed.
Any policies and procedures with respect to the receipt of compensation or
other consideration by the fund, its investment adviser, or any other party
in connection with the disclosure of information about portfolio securities.
The individuals or categories of individuals who may authorize disclosure
of the fund’s portfolio securities.
The procedures that the fund uses to ensure that disclosure of information
about portfolio securities is in the best interests of fund shareholders, in-
cluding procedures to address conflicts between the interests of fund share-
holders, on the one hand, and those of the fund’s investment adviser;
principal underwriter; or any affiliated person of the fund, its investment
adviser, or its principal underwriter, on the other.
And the manner in which the board of directors exercises oversight of dis-
closure of the fund’s portfolio securities.
Market Timing Adopting Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,306 (footnotes omitted); see
Form N-1A, supra  note 121, at Item 11(f)(1).
127 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2005).  As originally proposed, Rule 204A-1 would have
required investment advisers to adopt codes of ethics that included provisions de-
signed to prevent access to material, nonpublic information about client holdings
and transactions, see Codes of Ethics Proposing Release, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040, 4041 (Jan. 27, 2004) (noting that proposed
Rule 204A-1(a)(3) required codes of ethics to “include provisions reasonably de-
signed to prevent access to material nonpublic information about the adviser’s secur-
ities recommendations, and client securities holdings and transactions, unless those
individuals need the information to perform their duties”), but the Commission ulti-
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adviser recordkeeping rule to require certain employees of the
adviser to report trades in securities, including trades in mutual
fund shares.128  Previously, transactions in mutual fund shares
were expressly excluded from the reporting requirements under
the Advisers Act because the Commission did not believe that
mutual funds presented opportunities for insider trading.129
Finally, the Commission also promulgated substantive stan-
dards for portfolio disclosure policies.  In the release adopting
Rule 38a-1, the Commission states that “[d]ivulging nonpublic
portfolio holdings to selected third parties is permissible only
when the fund has legitimate business purposes for doing so and
the recipients are subject to a duty of confidentiality, including a
duty not to trade on the nonpublic information.”130  This expan-
sive dictum will effectively force funds that provide any portfolio
disclosure beyond that required by law to do so only pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement and a “legitimate business purpose”
in both cases subject to the SEC’s satisfaction.  The Commission
identifies no authority for this standard other than the exemption
from Regulation FD’s general prohibition against selective dis-
closure for disclosure to persons who have agreed to maintain
confidentiality.131  Regulation FD hardly supports the SEC’s po-
sition, however, as it is intended to address only classic insider
trading based on material, nonpublic information about securi-
ties “such as advance warnings of earnings results” that affect
their true value,132 a concern that does not apply in the mutual
fund context;133 and it specifically excludes mutual funds from its
coverage.134
In effect, the Commission has created a new substantive legal
duty under which funds may disclose their portfolios selectively
mately decided only to remind advisers that such provisions already would be re-
quired under section 204A and that fund advisers’ compliance procedures, as
required under Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act, should incorporate
the adviser’s policies and procedures under section 204A, see Compliance Programs
Adopting Release, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg.
74,714, 74,717-18 (Dec. 24, 2003).
128 See  17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(12)(i)–(iii), (13)(i)–(iii), (e)(1) (2005).
129 See supra  text accompanying note 89.
130 Market Timing Adopting Release, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,306.
131 See id.  at n.42.
132 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Adopting Release, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716.
133 See supra  text accompanying notes 59-61.
134 See supra  text accompanying notes 90–91.
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only pursuant to a confidentiality agreement and only when
there is a legitimate business purpose.  The SEC’s inspection staff
presumably will be the arbiter as to what constitutes a legitimate
business purpose.  Any inadequacy in funds’ policies relating to
these substantive requirements will likely bring heightened regu-
latory scrutiny, and any deviation from the policies may consti-
tute a disclosure violation.135
These disclosure requirements seem particularly inappropriate
to the extent that the concern is the use of fund information for
purposes of fund arbitrage.  As discussed above, fund portfolio
information is not material to arbitrageurs, and its usefulness
does not turn on whether it is nonpublic.136  In fact, to the extent
that the new disclosure requirements cause funds that use stale
prices or permit late trading to publicly disclose portfolio hold-
ings that otherwise would have been only selectively disclosed,
non-arbitrageur shareholders may be worse off because the po-
tential harm from fund arbitrage could increase as a result.137  In
contrast, while arbitrageurs generally prefer more frequent dis-
closure of portfolio information, they generally will be indiffer-
ent to whether the information is publicly available.  The harm
that results from the use of the portfolio information arises from
the fund’s stale price or the opportunity to enter a late trade, not
from the selectiveness of the disclosure of the information.138
The SEC’s new disclosure policy creates a contradiction.
Before quarterly disclosure of fund portfolios was required, a
fund manager who selectively disclosed portfolio information on
a quarterly basis risked violating section 204A.  Now that quar-
terly disclosure is required, that section 204A liability risk has
disappeared, despite the fact that the potential for fund arbitrage
is, if anything, greater than before.  The same abuse (fund arbi-
135 See  15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2000) (generally prohibiting, in fund filings, the
making of any untrue statements of material fact or the omitting of any fact neces-
sary to prevent other statements from being materially misleading).
136 See supra  text accompanying notes 62-68.
137 See supra  text accompanying note 70.  If funds continue to use stale prices, the
more frequent disclosure of portfolio holdings recently required by the Commission
probably will increase shareholders’ arbitrage losses in those funds.
138 Contra  Allan Sloan, Where’s the Outrage? , WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at E03
(“Let’s think for a minute about many of the transactions that regulators have de-
scribed.  Well-connected investors get real-time information about what’s in mutual
funds’ portfolios, information that’s not available to the public.  Then these Con-
nected Ones use that information to make profits.  ‘If it’s material, nonpublic and
they’re trading on it to their advantage, it’s insider trading,’ says Stephen Cutler,
director of enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Exactly so.”).
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trage) that funds are required to protect against by prohibiting
selective disclosure of portfolio information will occur when
portfolio information is publicly disseminated, yet under the
SEC’s position, the public dissemination insulates the fund man-
ager from section 204A liability while increasing the potential
harm to the fund.  The mistaken position in this contradiction is
not the requirement for more frequent disclosure but the belief
that the disclosure of portfolio information to fund arbitrageurs
violates section 204A.
The new disclosure requirements will be of little or no value to
shareholders.139  The Commission stated that they “are intended
to provide greater transparency of fund practices with respect to
the disclosure of the fund’s portfolio holdings,” but it offered no
explanation as to how it expects investors to use this information
to evaluate the fund.140  The new disclosure requirements will im-
pose additional costs on funds and further complicate fund dis-
closure without any clear countervailing benefit.  Only investors
who want to obtain more frequent and/or current portfolio dis-
closure are affected by such disclosure, and we can rely on them
to ask for it.  It will provide no additional protection to other
shareholders.  They are not interested in or benefited by evaluat-
ing disclosure policies to determine when other investors are be-
ing provided with portfolio information.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has recently settled a series of cases that at-
tempt to establish a new form of insider trading: the use of non-
public information about mutual fund portfolio holdings to
engage in fund arbitrage.  The cases alleged that fund managers
violated rules requiring that they adopt procedures to prevent
the misuse of material, nonpublic information about fund portfo-
lio holdings.  These rules were not intended to require such pro-
cedures, however, as fund arbitrage based on fund portfolio
holdings does not constitute insider trading.  The SEC’s enforce-
ment actions, if actually litigated, would be summarily dismissed.
Access to portfolio disclosure information can be helpful to
139 Contra Market Timing Adopting Release, Securities Act Release No. 8408,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300, 22,307 (Apr. 23,
2004) (“[W]e believe that investors have a significant interest  in knowing how widely
and with whom the fund shares its portfolio holdings information.” (emphasis
added)).
140 See id.  at 22,305.
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arbitrageurs, but it is not material for purposes of the federal se-
curities laws.  The fact that the information is nonpublic has no
bearing on the value of the information to the fund arbitrageur.
In fact, the public release of the information, if it affects the pos-
sibility of fund arbitrage at all, may result in greater, not lesser,
harm.  There may be, however, certain types of fund information
that could be used for insider trading in mutual fund shares, such
as information about how the funds are valued.
The SEC’s new disclosure rules regarding the disclosure of
portfolio disclosure policies, like its selective disclosure cases,
misunderstand the true cause of fund arbitrage losses.  Rather
than focusing on the funds’ disclosure of portfolio holdings, the
Commission should direct its efforts toward detecting and deter-
ring the violations of fund pricing and sales rules that are the
direct cause of losses resulting from fund arbitrage.
